We provides a new explanation for the dominance of the low-powered incentive contract over the high-powered one.
Introduction
The central topic of moral hazard problem is to provide incentive contracts to motivate the agent's effort. Higher incentive pay will induce the agent to work harder and consequently bring higher surplus to the principal. However, the arrangements employers typically reach with their employees in reality look quite different from the incentive contracts derived by economic theorists. Low-powered incentives are very common in practice, especially within organizations. Many firms prefer to pay fixed compensation and offer continued employment to all but clearly unsatisfactory employees. Good examples are the government agencies and public firms, which are generally blamed for poor performance because their managers and workers lack high-powered incentives. Based on the standard transaction-cost and principalagent economics, several theories have been provided to explain why low-powered incentives are employed even if objective performance measures are available and agents are highly responsive to incentive pay. Williamson (1985) argues that weak incentive arises from opportunism and incompleteness of contracts. He shows that the use of high-powered incentives would raise undesirable side problems such as exploitation, inefficient asset utilization and accounting manipulations. For example, if supplying a single large customer would require a firm to make a large investment in an asset that cannot be used readily for other purposes, the supplier may reasonably fear exploitation by the customer: once the investment is made, the customer could force a lower price on the supplier. The problem is not simply that one party to the transaction may end up being treated unfairly. The bigger problem is that as people will anticipate this possibility, the transaction may not take place at all. Even if the manufacturer intends to keep his commitment, a transaction beneficial to both sides may be aborted because the supplier cannot trust him. One possible solution to this problem is to write a court enforceable contract specifying how each party must behave under a number of different contingencies. Unfortunately, as Williamson points out, contracts are not always effective in preventing opportunism in that due to limits to human information-processing abilities, it is often impossible to anticipate all possible contingencies, let alone specify them in a contract. This leaves scope for opportunism, so the supplier and manufacturer have to replace the high-powered market transaction with low-powered incentive inside firms. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that the power of incentives on some tasks relies on the principal's ability to monitor other aspects of the agent's performance. The agents may shift their effort from some activities where their individual contributions are poorly measured to the better-measured and well-compensated activities. For this reason, highpowered incentive may be dysfunctional in multi-task environment.
The conclusion of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) relies largely on the assumptions that agent is risk averse and the tasks are substitute. On the contrary, Baker (1992) shows that low-powered incentive might arise even with risk neutral agent when the performance measure used and the principal's true objective are weakly correlated. That means if the performance measure does not respond to the agent's actions in the same way that the principal's objective responds to these actions, the firm will reduce the intensity of the incentive contract.
Aside from piece rates or commissions, another way that firms use to compensate agent is by relative performance evaluation such as awarding promotions to a member of a work group who performs best. In fact, in some political organizations such as government agencies, the agents are rewarded mainly on relative performance measures rather than on their individual output. One function of relative performance evaluation is allowing the principal to use flatter incentives.
1 In this sense, the literature justifying relative performance evaluations also gives partial explanations on the arising of low-powered incentive. Lazear and Rosen (1981) show in a standard single moral-hazard framework that the promotion-based incentive scheme can achieve the same results as other incentive schemes can. They argue that the dominance of the promotion-based incentive scheme over the piece-rate linear scheme and the standard bonus scheme arises from the fact that obtaining ordinal measures generally requires less resources than obtaining cardinal measures. Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) show also in the single moral-hazard framework that the relative performance evaluation incentive scheme may dominate the absolute performance evaluation scheme when the agents are risk-averse and there are shocks that are common to all the agents. Obviously, the promotion-based incentive scheme, by filtering out common randomness, can reduce the risk that would otherwise be imposed on the agents and requires compensation. Therefore, the relative performance evaluation improves the principal's efficiency.
Another class of literature closely related to the present paper is in the area of multidimensional mechanism design. The multidimensional mechanism design problem arises when the agent possesses multiple characteristics. Its implementability is much more complicated than that in the unidimensional mechanism design problem because of the lack of a natural order on types.
The studies on this topic can be traced back to Laffont, Maskin, and Rochet (1987) , Rochet (1987) , and Wilson (1993) , etc.
2 The most notable publications in this field include Armstrong (1996) , Rochet and Choné (1998) and Basov (2001) among many others. Armstrong (1996) formulates this problem in a multiproduct nonlinear pricing setting. In this seminal paper, he develops an integration along rays technique and characterizes the pricing contract for the case with cost-based tariff. Rochet and Choné(1998) analyze a general multidimensional screening model. They show that, in general, the monopolist will use mechanisms in which there is bunching, i.e., different consumer-types will be treated equally. They develop a methodology -sweeping technique, for dealing with bunching in multiple dimensions. Basov (2001) takes advantage of control theoretic tools and develops a "generalized Hamiltonian approach" for solving the multidimensional mechanism design 1 Rank order tournaments is a simple and widely used form of relative performance evaluation. This classical form of relative performance compensation has the particularity of using only an ordinal ranking of performance.
By awarding high and low prizes based on relative performance, a principal can elicit a higher effort level than with a scheme that involves the same wage bill but equal wages. An agent's performance is increasing in the spread between the winner and loser prize, ceteris paribus, rather than the absolute payment levels. It therefore allows the principal to elicit a higher effort level using lower performance pay. 2 We thank one of the anonymous referees for reminding us of these papers.
problem.
In this paper, we provide a new explanation for the dominance of low-powered over highpowered incentives. Our contributions are two-fold. First, in contrast to most of the existing literature dealing with the power-of-incentive issue in the framework of pure moral hazard, our analysis is made in a hybrid model of both moral hazard and adverse selection. 3 The standard moral hazard model concerns only the trade-off between insurance and incentives.
In these environments, the compensation based on certain "risky" performance measure serves the dual functions of increasing both profits and risk. A tension between these two functions arises when the agent is risk averse. Higher pay induces the agent to exert a higher level of effort and thus increases the principal's profit. On the other hand, high wage also exposes the agent to unwanted risk, which requires an extra risk premium as compensation.
Consequently, when choosing contract, the principal trades off the benefits of more effort against higher wage costs. Most of the existing studies assume that only the agent's actions are unobservable. In contrast, our paper assumes that the agent is privately informed about both his actions and types. The principal therefore is faced with an additional tradeoffthe tradeoff between efficiency and rent extraction. We show that the incentive contract is inclined to be flatter in the hybrid model than in the pure moral hazard model. Furthermore, it is worth noting that if the agent owns multidimensional private information and the base wage depends only on the Σ−norm of the performance wage, the efficient linear compensation rule contains no incentive component for most of the performance measures.
Secondly, we develop a "delegating" method for the complex multidimensional mechanism design problem. The intuition behind this method is a tradeoff between authority and complexity. As a centralized way of resource allocation, an incentive mechanism vests all the decision making authority in the principal, but it needs to process information transmitted by the agent. The multidimensional information increases the principal's information processing cost and complexity of writing a contract. The more authority the principal owns, the more information he has to process. Therefore, in order to save information processing cost and avoid complexity of writing a multidimensional contract, the principal may choose to 3 Laffont and Tirole (1986) , Picard (1987) , Guesnerie, Picard and Rey (1989) , Melumad and Reichelstein (1989), Caillaud, Guesnerie and Rey (1992) , Basov and Bardsley (2005) , among many others, discuss the welfare losses issue in the joint presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Their main conclusion is that under risk neutrality, if the noise in production technology is independent of the agent's type, and the effort is unidimensional, hidden action does not create any additional welfare loss, comparatively to the models with observable actions. Basov and Danilkina (2010) shows that hidden action will generically lead to a welfare loss even if both parties are risk neutral and production technology is independent of the agent's type, provided that both effort and private information are multidimensional. Our model, however, is trying to answer a different question: with risk averse agent, whether hidden information leads to a flatter wage contract comparatively to the model with observable information? We are thankful to a referee for bringing our attention to these papers.
delegate part of his authority to the agent. Two extreme cases of this tradeoff in practice are a decentralized market economy which distributes all the decision making authority to individual agents so that their communications requirements can be minimal (See Hurwicz (1972 , 1986 , Mount and Reiter (1974) , Walker (1977) , Osana (1978) , Tian (1994 Tian ( , 2004 Tian ( , 2006 among others for detailed discussion); and socialist economy in which a central planner has almost all the authority but a great amount of information has to be processed.
In this paper, part of the principal's authority is delegated to the agent under the assumption that the fixed component of compensation bases only on a quadratic form (Σ − norm) of the vector of incentive compensation coefficients. This assumption deprives some of the principal's degrees of freedom but decreases drastically the amount of information required.
The multidimensional mechanism design problem is therefore relatively easily solved.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic multi-task principal-agent model is specified in Section 2, along with a characterization of the pure moral hazard contract. The results with unobservable risk aversion are examined in Section 3. The results with unobservable cost are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 considers the optimal incentive contract in a general environment where risk aversion and cost are both unobservable.
Finally, in Section 6, some concluding remarks are given.
Basic Model
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which the agent controls n activities that influence the principal's payoff. The principal is risk neutral and her gross payoff is a linear function of the agent's effort vector e:
where the n−dimensional vector β characterizes the marginal effect of the agent's effort e on V (e), and η is a noise term with zero mean. The agent chooses a vector of efforts
2 , where C is a symmetric positive definite matrix. The diagonal element C ii reflects the agent's task-specific productivities, while the sign of off-diagonal elements C ij indicates the relationship between two tasks i and j, which are substitute (resp. complementary, independent) if C ij > 0 (resp. < 0, = 0). The agent's preferences are represented by the negative exponential utility function u(
where r is the agent's absolute risk aversion and x is his compensation minus personal cost.
It is assumed that there is a linear relation between the agent's efforts and the expected levels of the performance measures:
where b i ∈ Ê n captures the marginal effect of the agent's effort e on the performance measure
is an m×n matrix of performance parameters, and it is assumed that the matrix B has full row rank m so that every performance measure cannot be replaced by the other measures; and = (ε 1 , · · · , ε m ) is an m×1 vector of normally distributed variables with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Σ. 
Definition 1 (Orthogonality) A performance system is said to be orthogonal if and only
In single-task agency relationships, the signal-to-noise ratio of performance measure Kim and Suh (1991) ). Schnedler (2008) generalizes the signal-to-noise ratio to account for multidimensional effort. In his definition, the signal-to-noise ratio of performance measure P i (e) = b i e + σ i , denoted by γ i , is
Performance measures with higher signal-to-noise ratios provide more precise information about the agent's effort choice than those with lower signal-to-noise ratios. Clearly, the signal-to-noise ratio does not account for the agent's task-specific abilities and interaction among tasks. Furthermore, there is no concept measuring to what degree two performance measures are aligned with each other in the existing literature. The definition of costadjusted correlation given above, however, captures these ideas. If n tasks are technologically independent and identical, i.e., C = cI, then we use the concept correlation ρ ij ≡ b i b j /σ ij to measure the degree of alignment between two performance measures, and it is clear that
Definition 3 (Cost-adjusted Congruence) The cost-adjusted congruence of a performance
Baker (2002) defines the congruence of a performance measure as cosine of the angle between the vector of payoff sensitivities and the vector of performance measure sensitivities:
. Also, his definition does not consider the agent's task-specific abilities and interaction among tasks. So we adopt a modified measure of congruity given in (4). If C is a scalar matrix, then Γ i = Υ i . In this paper, a performance measure with nonzero costadjusted congruence is said to be congruent; a performance measure with unit cost-adjusted congruence is said to be perfectly congruent. We assume in this paper that there exists at least one congruent measure, i.e., BC −1 β = 0.
The principal compensates the agent's effort through a linear contract:
where P (e) = (P 1 (e), · · · , P m (e)) , w 0 denotes the base wage, and w = (w 1 , · · · , w m ) the performance wage. Under this linear compensation rule, the principal's expected profit is Π p = β e − w 0 − w Be, and the agent's certainty equivalent is
The principal's problem is to design a contract (w 0 , w) that maximizes her expected profit Π p while ensuring the agent's participation and eliciting his optimal effort.
The optimization problem of the principal is thus formulated as: 
The IR constraint ensures that the principal cannot force the agent into accepting the contract, and here the agent's reservation utility is normalized to zero; the IC constraint represents the rationality of the agent's effort choice.
We now consider the effort choosing problem of the agent for a given incentive scheme (w 0 , w). Since the objective is concave by noting that the second-order derivative of CE a with respect to e is a negative definite matrix −C, the maximizer can be determined by the first-order condition: Ce = B w. After replacing e with e * = C −1 B w and substituting the IR constraint written with equality into the principal's objective function, the principal's optimization problem simplifies to:
The optimal wage contract and effort to be elicited are therefore:
The resulting surplus of the principal is
A higher incentive pay could induce the agent to implement a higher effort, but it will also expose the agent to a higher risk. It therefore requires a premium to compensate the riskaverse agent for the risk he bears. The optimal power of incentive is therefore determined by the tradeoff between incentive and insurance. Moreover, the results above show that in multitask agency relationships, the degree of congruity of available performance measures and the agent's task-specific abilities also affects the power and distortion of incentive contract, which is in line with many previously known studies such as those of Feltham and Xie (1994), Baker (2002) and Thiele (2008) .
The optimal contract with unobservable risk aversion
The pure moral hazard incentive contract stated above relies crucially on the agent's attitude towards risk. In the following, we assume that risk aversion r is private information of the agent, and its distribution function F (r) and density function f (r) supported on [r, r] are common knowledge to all parties. This assumption is different to most of the previous studies in which risk aversion is regarded as a publicly observed variable. The principal then has to offer a contract menu {w 0 (r), w(r)} contingent on the agent's reported "type"r to maximize her expected payoff.
The timing of this hybrid model is as follows. At date 0, nature determines r, only the agent knows it. At date 1 the principal offers the agent an employment contract (w 0 (r), w(r)) based upon the agent's reportr. If this contract guarantees at least the same expected utility as his reservation wage (which is normalized to zero), the agent accepts the contract and reportsr. At date 2, after accepting his contract and reporting his typer, the agent implements an effort vector e. At date 3, the agent's performance measure P (e) as well as his contribution to firm value, V (e), are realized. At date 4, the payment is made.
A contract {w 0 (r), w(r)} is said to be implementable if the following incentive compatibility condition is satisfied:
Let U (r,r) ≡ w 0 (r) + 1 2 w(r) BC −1 B − rΣ w(r), 5 and U (r) ≡ U (r, r), then the implementability condition of {U (r), w(r)} is stated equivalently as:
The "Taxation Principle" [cf. Guesnerie (1981) , Hammond (1979) and also Rochet (1985)] states that (12) is equivalent to the following very similar condition
5 Substituting e * = C −1 B w into expression (6) yields U = w0 + 1 2
It is possible to show that U (·) is continuous, convex 6 (thus almost everywhere differentiable), and satisfies the envelop condition:
Conversely, if (14) holds and U (r) is convex, then
which implies the incentive compatibility condition U (r) U (r,r 
Substituting U (r) into the principal's expected payoff, we get
The principal's optimization problem is therefore:
The following proposition summarizes the solution of the principal's problem.
Proposition 1 If Φ(r) is nondecreasing
7 , then the optimal wage contract is given by
where
Proof. See appendix.
The following conditions prove to be sufficient for the emergence of low-powered incentives.
6 One way to define the convex functions is through representing them as maximum of the affine functions, that is, s(x) is convex if and only if
w BC −1 B w, and
7 This condition is weaker than and could be implied by the monotone hazard rate property:
0. 8 Superscript "h" denotes "hybrid model of moral hazard and adverse selection". 
μm denote the spectral condition number of Σ and BC −1 B respectively. • the performance measures system is orthogonal. In this case conditions (3.1) to (3.3) are all satisfied;
Condition 3.5 There exists a positive number λ such that BC
• Σ is a scalar matrix, in which case (3.1), (3.3) and (3.4) are satisfied;
• BC −1 B is a scalar matrix, in which case conditions (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) are satisfied.
Condition (3.5) emphasizes that the covariance matrix Σ is a transformation of the measurecost efficiency matrix BC −1 B . That is to say, correlation between any pair of performance measures i and j is constant:
By comparing the wage contract obtained in the hybrid model to the benchmark pure moral hazard model, we find that the principal will reduce the power of incentives offered to the agent.
9 That is, BC −1 B Σ is symmetric. 10 Matrices with condition numbers near 1 are said to be well-conditioned, while matrices with high condition numbers are said to be ill-conditioned.
Theorem 1

Given any one of the conditions 3.1 to 3.4, there exists an
i ∈ {1 · · · m}, such that |w h i (r)| < |w p i (r)| for all r ∈ (r,r];
If both condition 3.1 and condition 3.2 are satisfied, then |w
be the eigenspace corresponding to ω i , and 
The ith generalized eigenvalue of
, the associated normalized generalized eigenvector e i has its ith entry one and every other entry zero.
That means any performance measure is congruent, i.e., Γ i = 0 (though not necessarily be perfectly congruent). It follows from w h = kw p that
Consequently, we get BC −1 B = Φ(r)−kr k−1 Σ. In summary, for an orthogonal system with congruent measures, wage vectors w p and w h have the same direction if and only if all the performance measures share the same cost-adjusted signal-to-noise ratio.
It may be remarked that adverse selection is followed by moral hazard in our hybrid model. 
This problem could be simplified to
The optimal wage contract under pure adverse selection entails:
Comparing it with (16) yields |w
Therefore, the power of incentives in hybrid model is not lower than that in pure adverse selection model.
11
The optimal contract with unobservable cost
In this section we assume that the cost parameter is private information of the agent. To avoid the complicated multidimensional mechanism design issue momentarily, we assume that C = cI, that is, the tasks are technologically identical and independent. δ = 1 c is assumed to be distributed on the support [δ, δ] , according to a cumulative distribution function G(δ) and density g (δ) . The timeline of this problem is anologous to that in Section 3 except that the agent is now required to reportδ. A contract menu {w 0 (δ), w(δ)} is said to be implementable if the following incentive compatibility condition is satisfied:
or equivalently,
11 We are thankful to a referee for bringing this point to our attention.
U (δ) is necessarily continuous, increasing and convex in δ 12 and satisfies the envelop condition:
Conversely, similar to the case with unobservable risk aversion, the convexity of U (δ) and envelop condition (22) implies
which in turn implies the implementability of contract. We summarize the above discussion in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The surplus function U (δ) and wage function w(δ) are implementable if and only
The second-best δ−contingent contract solves the following optimization problem:
Proposition 2 With unobservable cost, if δH(δ) is nonincreasing 13 , then the optimal wage is given by
The following conditions justify the adoption of low-powered incentives in the case with unobservable cost parameter.
Condition 4.1 BB is a diagonal matrix.
Condition 4.2 Matrices BB and Σ commute: BB Σ = ΣBB . (aδ + b) is convex in δ. 13 This assumption is a bit stronger than the usual monotone inverse hazard rate condition. It holds for any nondecreasing g(·).
14 Again, it is true if BB Σ is symmetric. In the special case where performance measures system is orthogonal, conditions (3.1),(4.1) and (4.2) are satisfied. If Σ (resp. BB ) is a scalar matrix, then conditions (3.1) (resp. ( 4.1)) and (4.3) are both satisfied. Besides, condition (4.3) could hold even for nondiagonal BB and Σ, provided either of them is well-conditioned or r δ is sufficiently small.
Condition 4.3 The following inequality holds:
2ν 2 m + r δ η > 0. (25) η = max min i=1,m λ i ν m ( √ k λ + 1) 2 − k ν ( √ k λ − 1) 2 2 √ k λ , min i=1,m ν i λ m ( √ k ν + 1) 2 − k λ ( √ k ν − 1) 2 2 √ k ν = ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ λ m ν m ( √ kλ+1) 2 −kν ( √ kλ−1) 2 2 √ kλ if √ k ν √ kλ+1 √ kλ−1 , k ν k λ λ m ν m ( √ kν +1) 2 −kλ( √ kν −1) 2 2 √ kν if √ k ν √ kλ+1 √ kλ−1 , k ν < k λ λ 1 ν m ( √ kλ+1) 2 −kν ( √ kλ−1) 2 2 √ kλ if √ k ν > √ kλ+1 √ kλ−1 , k ν k λ λ m ν 1 ( √ kν +1) 2 −kλ( √ kν −1) 2 2 √ kν if √ k ν > √ kλ+1 √ kλ−1 , k λ < k λ represents
Theorem 2 1. Given any of conditions (3.1), (4.1),(4.2), (4.3), there exists at least one
i ∈ {1, · · · , m}, such that |w h i (δ)| < |w p i (δ)| for all δ ∈ [δ,δ);
If both conditions (3.1) and (4.1) are satisfied, namely, the performance measure system is orthogonal, then |w
h i (δ)| < |w p i (δ)| for all δ ∈ [δ,δ) and all i; 3. Let τ i , i ∈ L ≡ {1, 2, · · · , l} denote l distinct generalized eigenvalues of BB relative to Σ, U i ≡ N (BB − τ i Σ) be the eigenspace corresponding to τ i , U ⊥ i be its orthogonal complement. Suppose that Bβ / ∈ i∈L U ⊥ i , then there exists a positive number s ∈ (0, 1) such that w h = sw p if
and only if condition (4.4) is met.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to that in Theorem 1 and it is omitted here.
When the agent possesses private information on his own cost, a more efficient agent (the agent with higher δ) would accrue information rent by mimicking his less efficient counterpart. To minimize agency costs, optimality requires a downward distortion of the power of inefficient types' incentive wage. Theorem 2 gives various conditions ensuring low-powered incentives. If the performance measure sensitivities are orthogonal to each other (b i b j = 0 for i = j), or error terms are uncorrelated (σ ij = 0 for i = j), or either BB or Σ is wellconditioned (k ν or k λ is close to one), or the agent is nearly risk neutral (r is very small), or the agent is highly efficient (δ is very large), then the power of incentives will be lowered for at least one performance measure. For an orthogonal system with all its performance measures congruent (b i β = 0 for all i), the wage vector in hybrid model is shorter than but points in the same direction as its pure moral hazard counterpart if and only if all the measures share the same signal-to-noise ratio
The optimal contract with both unobservable cost and risk aversion
In this section we assume that both efficiency parameter δ and risk aversion r are unobservable to the principal, their joint PDF is f (δ, r) supported on a convex region D. Timing of the model is anologous to that in Section 3 and Section 4 except that the agent is now required to report bothr andδ. The multidimensional mechanism design model differs markedly from and is significantly more complex than its one-dimensional counterpart, essentially because different types of agents cannot be unambiguously ordered. For lack of methodology in the most general sense, various assumptions and methods have been used to solve the multidimensional mechanism design models in the existing literature. In a nonlinear pricing setup, Armstrong (1996) adopts an integration along rays procedure solving the relaxed problem of the principal, but the envelop condition could be satisfied by the pointwise maximizer only by accident, let alone the convexity condition. In order for the contract to be implementable, he makes separable assumptions on the indirect utility and density functions. Rochet and Choné (1998) develop a general technique for dealing with the multi-dimensional screening problem, but it is workable only in the case where the dimensionality of type space is the same as the number of the principal's available instruments. The generalized Hamiltonian approach developed by Basov (2001) circumvents this difficulty but it obtains the optimal contract from a system of partial differential equations, which usually has no analytic solution. Therefore, one often has to rely upon the numerical techniques except for some very special function form.
In the following, we will treat the choosing of optimal performance wage as a multidimensional mechanism design problem. In order to get an explicit analytic solution, we impose restrictions on the set of implementable allocations by assuming that the performance evaluation system is such that BB = kΣ or the base wage is based on the Σ−norm of performance wage vector.
The performance measurement system with constant correlation
If correlation between any pair of performance measures is constant, i.e.,
then BB = kΣ. This means the deterministic part of a performance measurement system covaries with its stochastic counterpart. With this assumption, the agent's surplus could be represented as a function of a scalar θ 1 ≡ kδ − r,
Then, as in the previous sections, we get the convexity and envelop conditions (u(θ 1 ) is convex in θ 1 and u (θ 1 ) = 1 2 w Σw), which in turn implies the implementability of contract. We also define θ 2 ≡ kδ + r. Then the original type vector (δ, r) is transformed linearly to (θ 1 , θ 2 ). Notice that θ 1 is the only variable affecting the agent's choice, and the principal may elicit it using an incentive compatible contract when it is unknown. θ 2 has no informative value to the agent since it is irrelevant to the agent's decision-making. As such, the principal lacks instrument to elicit it. That means the principal cannot trust the information about θ 2 reported by the agent even if he is telling the truth. Therefore, the wage contract may depend on θ 1 whether it is observable or not. However, it may depend on θ 2 only when it is observable.
Let Θ denote the support of the transformed types (θ 1 , θ 2 ), which is defined by θ 1
2k denote the joint density of (θ 1 , θ 2 ), where
is the Jacobian determinant of the coordinate transformation. Assumptions 1 and 2 are the familiar monotone inverse hazard rate conditions on the marginal and conditional distributions. Condition 3 implies Cov(θ 1 , θ 2 ) 0. The optimality of wage requires it to be nonincreasing in θ 2 , while the implementability constraint requires wage to be increasing in θ 1 (Note that u(θ 1 ) is convex in θ 1 and u (θ 1 ) = 1 2 w Σw), so we need to assume these two parameters to be negatively correlated. This condition holds if k is small or σ r is sufficiently large relative to σ δ . Assumption 4 ensures that the virtual valuation θ 1 − À(θ 1 ) is nonnegative everywhere, this assumption is commonly made in the mechanism design and auction literature.
It turns out that there are four cases (labelled as I to IV) of interest depending on the observabilities of θ 1 and θ 2 . 
The following theorem shows that unobservability of θ 1 may lead to low-powered incentives, but it is not necessarily the case with unobservable θ 2 .
Theorem 3 Suppose that a performance system P = (B, Σ) has constant correlation, i.e., 
The efficiency parameter δ and the risk aversion r affect the agent's payoff in different ways. δ affects his effort provision (e * = δB w) and thus term (w 0 + w Be * − 1 2δ e * e * ) in his profit, while r affects his risk premium ( r 2 w Σw). Misreporting these two parameters helps the agent get information rents with two degrees of freedom. However, if the correlation between any pair of performance measures is constant, all the information relevant to the agent's decision-making is contained in a scalar θ 1 , and the agent is in fact deprived of one of his degrees of freedom. Therefore, the multidimensional mechanism design problem simplifies to the traditional one-dimensional problem. The low-powered incentives are resulted from traditional rent extraction-efficiency trade-off. Note that θ 2 is an irrelevant parameter to the agent's decision making, it affects the principal's payoff by adding uncertainty rather than altering information rents. So the wage contract in cases I and II (cases III and IV as well) cannot be unambiguously ordered.
It is worth noting that if there is a single performance measure (m = 1), the condition BB = kΣ is clearly satisfied, and the mechanism design problem of principal is in fact unidimensional. Therefore, the multidimensional mechanism design problem may arise only in the joint presence of multidimensional types and multiple performance measures.
The
In this subsection, we assume that the base wage lies only on the Σ − norm of performance wage vector w, that is, w 0 = w 0 (w Σw), where w 0 (·) is a function of a scalar variable. That is to say, the employer determines the base wage solely on the Σ− norm of wage vector w rather than on its direction. There are two reasons for us to make this assumption.
First, this wage structure is very common in reality. It ties the employee's base wage (w 0 ) with the risk imposed on him (measured by w Σw). In managerial practice, employers usually set positions with varying degrees of importance and risk inside firms. The position with high pressure and high-risk is typically accompanied by high compensation. Agency theory asserts that business risk will be positively related to base pay in managerial compensation contracts.
The agent's risk averse behavior induced by higher strength of incentive compensation might be mitigated by increasing his wealth through higher base pay levels. This idea, which may goes back to Bernoulli (1758 Bernoulli ( /1954 , asserts that people's reactions to risk are inversely related to their level of wealth, greater wealth makes losses relatively less painful. Greater base pay increases the agent's wealth thereby offsetting some of the potential losses associated with both business risk and high-powered incentive compensation. Indeed, classic agency theory proposes that insurance will come in the form of higher base pay (Baiman, 1990 ). This premise is echoed in internal labor markets theory which asserts that people will require higher base pay levels in exchange for reduced stability in their employment and future income stream (Osterman, 1992) .
Secondly, this assumption is made for tractability. If both δ and r are unknown to the principal, he has to process multidimensional information reported by the agent and prevent the agent from misreporting either one of them. This is a very difficult task (this point will be shown later). To reduce the information required by a mechanism and thus make the model tractable, one may impose this restriction on the structure of wage contract. 
The contract menu (U, w) is called Σ−implementable if it belongs to
be the set of implementable allocations. 15 It is obvious that a Σ−implementable mechanism is implementable but it is not true vice versa:
is the first (largest) eigenvalue of matrix BB Σ −1 . The corresponding set of optimal wages for the agent is
where u(ϑ 1 ) in ϑ 1 , which is conversely sufficient for the implementability of contract. We further define ϑ 2 = δλ 1 + r, then the principal's optimization problem is reformulated as:
2λ1 is the joint density function supported on a convex region D ϑ . D ϑ is defined by: ϑ 1 ϑ 1 ϑ 1 and ϑ 2 (ϑ 1 ) ϑ 2 ϑ 2 (ϑ 1 ).
For expositional convenience we define the following notations
Analogous to the previous subsection, we need the following assumptions. 
Assumption 5 H(ϑ
The surplus of the principal is:
Q k Q k is the spectral projector of matrix Σ −1/2 BB Σ −1/2 corresponding to the first eigenvalue λ 1 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the original model, the contract {w 0 (δ, r), w(δ, r)} is implementable if for all (δ, r,δ,r) ∈ D 2 , the following incentive compatibility condition is satisfied:
and
Then {U (δ, r), w(δ, r)} is implementable if
Applying "taxation principle", it could be equivalently represented as: (δ, r) . Conversely, given the envelop and convexity conditions, we have the following incentive compatibility condition:
It implies that (i) the envelop conditions
The first inequality follows from the convexity condition, and the second is obtained by using the envelop condition. U (δ, r) and w(δ, r) are therefore implementable. Thus the principal's optimization problem is
Ignoring momentarily the convexity condition, the principal's relaxed problem could be regarded as an optimal control problem with multiple controls and double-fold integrals. The In order to get an explicit solution to the complete problem, we therefore sacrifice some of the principal's degrees of freedom by restricting our attention in the set of Σ−implementable allocations M Σ . We decompose the information contained in vector w into two aspects: its Σ−norm ( √ w Σw = x) and its direction. Meanwhile, the type vector (δ, r) is transformed linearly to (ϑ 1 , ϑ 2 ). Notice that, the Σ−norm of wage vector depends only on ϑ 1 , while its direction is at free disposal of the agent and depends on neither ϑ 1 nor ϑ 2 . Our Σ−normbased assumption on the base wage w 0 limits greatly the power of the principal since he now has only the discretion to choose Σ − norm of wage vector contingent on the agent's report ϑ 1 . The agent, on the contrary, is vested the right of choosing the direction of wage vector.
Therefore, this procedure is in fact a process of delegating part of the principal's authority to the agent. Under the assumptions we made, the multidimensional mechanism problem is solved with the same amount of computational work as in the one-dimensional screening problem after performing integration with respect to the irrelevant variable ϑ 2 .
In a special case of orthogonal performance measurement system, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For an orthogonal performance measurement system, there is no incentive in the performance measures with non-largest signal-noise ratio.
As mentioned above, the wage vector is determined by two aspects: its overall intensity (Σ − norm) and relative allocation among performance measures (direction). In our dimensionality-reducing procedure, the authority of choosing relative allocation is delegated to the agent. Then for an orthogonal system in which performance measures are totally independent to each other, the agent inclines to allocate the overall intensity to the measures with larger sensitivity (measured by b i 2 ) and smaller randomness (measured by σ 2 i ). Therefore he will put the overall intensity of incentives on the measures with the largest signal-noise ratio b i 2 /σ 2 i , and the measures with non-largest signal-noise ratios will be assigned zero incentive. The ideas that underlie this analysis have many applications. For example, in partially decentralized political system, if the central government gives grants to local governments to award themselves, but continues to control their total budgets, this will certainly weaken incentives of local governments to allocate budgetary resources on relatively nonsensitive and high-risk measures. It is commonly observed that in many developing countries under decentralization, local governments are usually enthusiastic about improving their economic performance, but they lack motivations to do the works which are either high-risk (say purely theoretical research) or cannot bring them notable achievements in the short run (say environmental protection). Our prediction fits well with these phenomena. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) show that missing incentive clauses are commonly observed in practice, even when good, objective output measures are available and agents are highly responsive to incentive pay. In their model, there exist multiple performance measures with varying degrees of accuracy (the tasks and performance measures are one-to-one corresponding to each other, that is, B = I), and the tasks are substitute to each other. In this setup, employees will concentrate their attention (effort) on improving the performance measure tied to high compensation, to the exclusion of hard-to-measure or even non-observable but important tasks. Therefore an optimal incentive contract can be to pay a fixed wage independent of measured performance. Corollary 1 here offers a different explanation to the missing incentive phenomenon. Notice that in this corollary, we assume that the performance measures are orthogonal to each other, which is quite different to the substitute condition required by Holmstrom and Milgrom's paper.
Our result is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for the case with m = 2; Figures 3 and 4 for the case with m = 3. When Σ is diagonal and the Σ − norm is fixed, w lies on an ellipse (resp. ellipsoid if m = 3) whose axes coincide with the Cartesian axes. The agent will choose a vector w to maximize w BB w. If BB is also diagonal, the optimal w must lie on the Cartesian axes or Cartesian planes.
Wage vector lies in this space FIGURE 1. Orthogonal system with
The following corollary provides a comparison of surpluses obtained using two performance measurement systems with the same largest signal-noise ratio. 
We next discuss the value of additional performance measures to an existing set. Let 
Corollary 3 If λ
In the environment of complete information (with observable costs and risk aversion), Feltham and Xie (1994) show that the incremental value of additional performance measures is always non-negative because the principal can always assign zero incentive to the additional measures. In this case, the principal's surplus obtained using the original performance system
the surplus obtained using the augmented performance measurement system
Bβ.
The incremental value of additional performance measures is thus:
The incremental value then is zero if and only if the measures provided by the original performance measurement system are a sufficient statistic for the measures provided by the augmented system, with respect to the agent's effort (If there exists a constant matrix Ξ, such that B 2 = ΞB 1 , Σ 21 = ΞΣ 11 , see Feltham and Xie (1994) for detailed discussion.).
According to this result, adding a performance measurement system which is orthogonal to the original one will increase the surplus for sure. Our result, on the contrary, states that the incremental value is zero if λ 1 > μ 1 , positive if λ 1 = μ 1 , and ambiguous if λ 1 < μ 1 . These new results come from the assumption that w 0 is based on the Σ − norm of w. Under this assumption, the performance measures associated with non-largest eigenvalues will be given zero weights, and the incremental value is therefore determined by the first eigenvalues of the original and new performance measurement systems.
Conclusion
In this paper, we explain the phenomenon of low-powered incentives from a new perspective.
We consider the case where the agent possesses private information about his own risk aversion and the cost of efforts. Besides the rents motivating the agent's efforts, the principal has to give up some additional information rents to the agent in order to elicit his truthtelling.
She has to consider two tradeoffs when choosing the optimal incentive contract. One is the tradeoff between insurance and incentives; the other is the tradeoff between efficiency and rent extraction. The former is the fundamental issue in moral hazard problem; while the latter lies in the core of adverse selection problem. We show that adverse selection usually leads to a flatter incentive contract comparatively to pure moral hazard situation. We further discuss this issue in the framework of multidimensionally hiden information. We first assume that the deterministic and stochastic components of a performance measurement system is proportional to each other. Under this assumption, the agent's private information relevant to his decision making is contained in a single scalar variable. The power of incentive is lower than that in the case where this scalar variable is observable. Furthermore, we assume the base wage depends only on the Σ − norm of performance wage vector, by which the principal reduces the complexity of computation by delegating part of the principal's decision-making authority to the agent. In this setup, we find that most performance measures are assigned to zero incentives. This provides a new explanation for the missing of incentive clauses in contracts.
Appendix A: Proofs and Lemmas
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Using the envelop condition U (r) = − 1 2 w Σw, the participation constraint U (r) 0 simplifies to U (r) 0. Incentive compatibility implies that only the participation constraint of the most risk averse type can be binding, i.e., U (r) = 0. We therefore get
The principal's objective function becomes
which, by an integration of parts, gives
Maximizing pointwise the above expression, we get
The only work left is to verify the convexity of U (r). Notice that
The second equality comes from the fact that the derivative of w h with respect to r is
It is clear that U (r) 0 because Φ (r) 0 and the matrix Σ BC −1 B + Φ(r)Σ −1 Σ is positive definite. The proof is completed.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
1. (a) Applying Lemma A.1, there exist a nonsingular matrix U such that
16 Let A be a nonsingular, m × m matrix whose elements are functions of the scalar parameter α, then
It is obvious that (w
(b) Also, we have 
We conclude that the power of incentive will be reduced for at least one performance measure.
(d) It follows from the expression of w p that
Differentiating (A.2) with respect to r yields ∂w w ∂r
Making use of Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3, we have 
It is obvious that |w 
If w h (r) = kw p (r) then
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Using integration by parts, we get
Substituting it into the expression of the principal's expected surplus and optimizing it with respect to w, we get the second-best performance wage w h (δ) , and w h 0 (δ) is also easily obtained. We now check the convexity of U (δ). The first order derivative of w h (δ) is
It can be verified that the matrix
which implies the convexity of U (δ).
A.4. Proof of Theorem 3
• Case IV : The principal's objective in Case IV is rewritten as:
. As a consequence, the principal's optimal contract design problem simplifies to a unidimensional mechanism design problem:
Using the integration by parts technique, the principal's objective can be expressed as:
We ignore momentarily the convexity condition and simply maximize this expression pointwise with respect to w to get:
.
18
17 To simplify notation, we drop the limits of integrals. The only task left is to check the convexity of function u(θ 1 ). Since 
• Case II : If θ 1 is observable and θ 2 is unknown to the principal, i.e., in Case II, we only need to consider the participation constraint u(θ 1 ) 0 in (A.6), then the wage contract and the corresponding surplus are
• Case III : In Case III, the principal's objective function is
Notice that in this case w depends on both θ 1 and θ 2 , so it cannot be reduced to onefold integral as in (A.5). The principal's optimization problem could thus be rewritten
The envelop condition implies u(θ 1 , θ 2 ) = θ1 θ 1 (θ2) 1 2 w Σwdθ 1 +s(θ 2 ). Substituting it into the principal's objective function and using the integration by parts technique yields
It is optimal to choose a function s(θ 2 ) such that
Assumption 4 ensuring the convexity condition, we get the optimal wage contract and surplus as follows:
• Case I : If θ 1 and θ 2 are both observable, we need only to consider IR constraint in (A.12), the wage contract and surplus are therefore
A.5. Proof of Theorem 4
Letting y = Σ 1/2 w, the embedded program max w∈W(x) w Bβ can be expressed as
Applying Lemma A.6, we get the solution and the corresponding maximized value of this
Following from the spectral representation theorem in linear algebra, Q k Q k is unique although Q k is usually not. (See Lemma A.7 for detailed discussion.)
The maxima to the original program max w∈W(x) w Bβ is therefore
Substituting this expression into (31), we can rewrite the optimization problem of the principal as
Integrating with respect to ϑ 2 , the above optimization can be simplified to a standard onedimensional screening problem:
Ignoring for a while the convexity condition and applying the standard technique, we obtain the solution to the relaxed problem:
It can be verified that under Assumptions 5 to 7, x(ϑ 1 ) is increasing in ϑ 1 . In turn, this implies the convexity of u(ϑ 1 ). Substituting (A.21) into (A.18) we get the optimal wage
The information rent accrued to the agent and surplus of the principal are also easily obtained:
A.6. Proof of Corollary 1
Let P = (B, Σ) be an orthogonal performance measurement system with Σ = diag{σ
m be the normalized eigenvector associated with λ 1 . Then
It follows that
Then we obtain
Therefore we write
whereQ k is a k × k orthogonal matrix. Substituting it into (A.22), we get
(A.25)
The optimal wages paid for the performance measures associated with the non-largest eigenvalues are zero:
A.7. Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose that P 1 and P 2 are orthogonal systems with the same first eigenvalues
), and the multiplicities of λ 1 are respectively k 1 and k 2 . Then the surplus obtained using system P 1 is
Where
. Similarly, the surplus obtained using system P 2 is:
A.8. Proof of Corollary 3
The matrix
19 Note that the term ϑ 1
also depends on λ1. 
is the spectral projector of Σ −1/2 BB Σ −1/2 associated with λ 1 . Then the expected revenue of the principal with augmented performance system P is ) associated with λ 1 (μ 1 ). Then the columns of matrix
form an orthonormal basis for eigenspace
3. The case λ 1 < μ 1 is similar to λ 1 > μ 1 . Then the proof is thus omitted.
A.9. Lemmas
Lemma A.1 Two real symmetric, positive-definite matrices can be simultaneously diago-
nalized.
Proof. Let A and B be two real symmetric positive-definite matrices, {τ i } be the set of 20 Note that this is not necessarily an orthogonal diagonalization, and then this result does not extend to the case of three or more matrices.
21 λm(·) stands for the least eigenvalue of a matrix.
Proof. See Alikakos and Bates (1984) for detailed discussion.
Lemma A.4 E(Y |X) is nonincreasing in X if and only if Cov(X, Y ) 0.
Proof. Since Cov(X, Y ) = E(X)E(Y ) − E(XY ) = E(X)E[E(Y |X)] − E[E(XY |X)] = E(X)E[E(Y |X)] − E[XE(Y |X)] = Cov[X, E(Y |X)], Cov(X, Y ) 0 if and only if E(Y |X)
is a nonincreasing function of X. • If α Q k Q k α = 0, it is optimal to choose
the corresponding optimal value is Π * = a α Q k Q k α.
The maxima for the original program is therefore , respectively. Then, C(P j ) = N (A − λ j I) = C(Q j ) (the symbol C(A) denotes the column space of a matrix A), so that P j = Q j L j for some ν j × ν j matrix L j . Moreover, since clearly
implying that L j is an orthogonal matrix. Thus,
We conclude that the decomposition A = k j=1 λ j F j is identical to the decomposition A = k j=1 λ j E j , and hence that the decomposition A = k j=1 λ j E j is unique (aside from the ordering of terms).
